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Abstract 
Japanese outbound M&A activity has been running at a record pace regardless of the 
exchange rate movements. This paper examines the determinants of Japanese outbound 
M&A activity and the link between the migrants, which refer to both immigrants and 
Japanese citizens residing abroad, and Japanese outbound cross-border M&A activity in 
order to investigate whether immigrants alleviate the informational problems and stimulate 
the cross-border M&A activity with their host countries. Our results suggest that both 
immigrant and Japanese citizens residing abroad increase the probability of acquiring the 
asset in a potential target country. Moreover, both stocks have also a positive effect on the 
number of outbound M&A deals and the value of outbound M&A deals.   
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1.  Introduction 
Home bias is the puzzling phenomenon of the international capital markets.  Since 
French and Poterba (1991) first documented the home bias in equities, this phenomenon is 
observed across different types of assets (see Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) for the survey). 
Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) summarized three classes of explanations: (i) hedging motives 
in frictionless financial markets, (ii) asset trade costs in international financial markets, and 
(iii) informational frictions and behavioral biases. Among these three classes of 
explanations, this paper focuses on the informational frictions in the flow of capital, and 
explores a positive association between the migration and the cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) activity to test whether the migration mitigate the informational 
friction.   
Many studies show that not only the formal trade barriers such as transportation costs 
and tariffs but also the informational barriers such as potential market opportunities are 
important.  The role of ethnic networks or migrant networks in overcoming the contractual 
and informational barriers are shown in the literature (for example, Gould (1994), Head 
and Ries (1998), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Combes et al. (2005), Peri and Requena-
Silvente (2010), Javorcik et al. (2011), Bansak et al. (2015), and Felbermayr et al. (2015)).  
Javorcik et al. (2011) documented that US FDI is positively correlated with the presence of 
migrants from the host country using a quasi-panel dataset that includes the stock of 
migrants in the US in 1990 and 2000, and data for 56 host countries.  Their results 
confirmed empirically the anecdotal evidence for the importance of migrant networks for 
FDI.  Kugler et al. (2013) investigated the impact of migration on financial flows and 
showed the role of migration in reducing information frictions between home and host 
countries.  As recent studies showed, the role of migration is found to be important not 
only in the case of manufactured goods but also of financial flows.  
This paper examines the link between the migrants, which refer to both immigrants and 
natives living abroad, and outbound cross-border M&A activity to test whether the 
migrants alleviate the informational problems and boost the cross-border M&A activity 
with their host countries.  Facing the rapid aging and shrinking market at home, Japanese 
firms accelerate their buying of overseas assets.  The informational problem in the cross-
border M&A activity is critical, because M&A is, in a sense, a mutual matching between 
the acquiring company and the overseas target company. Although the number of 
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immigrants in Japan is small among developed countries, Japanese firms have been 
expanding business overseas, which accompanied their Japanese workers engaging in the 
acquired business. To examine this mutual matching, we collect the data on inbound and 
outbound M&A deals. The coverage of acquirer’s nation in the inbound M&A deals is 
limited, hence we focus on the outbound M&A deals to cover the larger number of nations 
in the dataset. We use the data on the number of outbound M&A deals and the value of 
outbound M&A deal to measure the outbound M&A activity. The estimation results reveal 
that both immigrants and Japanese nationals living in the target country have the positive 
effects on the number of outbound M&A deals and the value of outbound M&A deal.  One 
of the contributions in this paper is to show that emigrant information spillover effect is 
also important as well as the immigrant network.   
The hypothesis proposed in this paper highlights the informational problem, focusing 
on the information spillovers effects on the sector in which the outbound M&A activity 
deal has taken place. The information effect is found to be important both in the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.  Then, the M&A deals are grouped by the 
R&D intensity to be tested if the information effect is different between the high R&D 
sectors and low R&D sectors. It can be assumed that the information is more valuable for 
the high R&D sectors which have firm-specific assets.  We find that the both immigrants 
and emigrants exert a strong effect on the number of outbound M&A deals for high R&D 
sectors.  
As Javorcik et al. (2011) pointed out, the problem that the existing literature ignored is 
the endogeneity that arises since M&A flows and immigrants can influence each other. The 
bias created by ignoring the endogeneity can be both positive and negative. Outbound 
M&A flows have opposite effects on the migration decision. That is, on the one hand, 
entry of multinationals can increase employment, provide better job opportunities and 
higher wage, which lower the incentive to migrate. On the other hand, the presence of 
multinational firms might facilitate both the acquisition of information regarding job 
opportunities in the destination country and the acquisition of skills evaluated more in the 
destination country (e.g., language) which in turn lowers the migration costs and increase 
the returns to migration. The net bias depends also on the skill level of immigrants, the low 
skilled immigrants (or potential immigrants) have less incentive to invest in the acquisition 
of skills evaluated mostly in the destination country (e.g. education and language), thus the 
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bias for them is likely to be negative. Assuming that most of the immigrants in Japan are 
low skilled we argue that the prevailing bias is negative. The comparison between the OLS 
and the 2SLS estimates shows that, in fact, after correcting for the endogeneity of 
migration, results explicitly present both higher magnitude of effects and higher statistical 
significance.  We are also concerned about the issue of the Japanese citizens residing 
abroad stock with respect to the outbound M&A activity, therefore, we explicitly take 
account of the endogeneity problem for both migration variables.  Estimation results not 
only provide evidence that both  immigrants and Japanese citizens residing abroad are 
important determinants of Japanese outbound M&A activity after controlling for the 
endogeneity problem, but also they suggest that the bias is negative for the stock of 
immigrants.    
We explore the migration impact conditioning on the possible determinants of cross-
border M&A suggested by the relevant literature (see Bodvarsson et al (2015) for a 
survey); growth of GDP per capita, inflation rate, country risk and exchange rate.  Prior 
studies on a link between exchange rate and cross-border M&A generated mixed results. 
The depreciation of the home currency increases the cost to acquire overseas assets.  On 
the other hand, on repatriating the revenues from acquired assets, the present discounted 
profits of the acquired assets will increase.  The asset acquisition hypothesis in Blonigen 
(1997) that the asset is transferable assuming the market segmentation or imperfect 
markets for goods, suggested that home currency depreciations theoretically can lead to 
increased acquisitions, particularly of firms that have firm-specific assets (empirically, 
high R&D manufacturing sectors).  Our results do not provide the strong evidence for the 
nexus between the exchange rate and outbound M&A activity.  
  In some countries, Japanese outbound M&A deals are made every year, but in other 
countries, we do not observe the constant deal making.  We test the Cragg’s specification 
for the outbound M&A deal value model and the hurdle model for the number of outbound 
M&A deals in terms of two decisions.  One decision is whether to be a participant, that is, 
whether to invest in a potential target country or not.  The second decision is how much 
money to invest or how many deals to make, in a target country, given that the value is 
positive.  The test results suggest that we estimate separately two decisions.  Hence, in 
addition to estimations for the value of M&A deals and the number of outbound M&A 
deals, we examine the decision choice model whether to make a deal in a potential target 
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country.  Our results suggest that the immigrant stock and the number of Japanese citizens 
residing abroad increase the probability of acquiring the asset in a potential target country. 
This result contributes to the debate on the importance of migration for the foreign direct 
investments.  Existing literature on the cross-border M&A does not consider this 
participation stage, that is whether to undertake M&A deal or not.  Furthermore, our results 
shed some light on a new aspect regarding the migration effects on cross-border M&A 
deals.  Conditioned on the immigrant stock, the country risk is also a determinant of this 
choice.  The decrease in the country risk will increase the probability of being invested by 
a Japanese firm. 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides some backgrounds on Japanese 
cross-border M&A activity and migration.  Section 3 describes our data, and details the 
model to be estimated and empirical methodology.  The empirical results are contained in 
Section 4.  The final section provides some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Backgrounds: Japanese cross-border M&A activity and migration 
2.1  Trends in Japanese cross-border M&A activity 
      A confluence of business circumstance on Japanese firms including the rapid aging 
society, global reorganization in the industry and shrinking market at home, makes 
Japanese firms buy overseas assets at a record-breaking pace.  One of unique 
characteristics in Japanese M&A activity is the big gap between the inbound and the 
outbound M&A activity with respect of the number and value of M&A deals as shown in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2.  Figure 1 shows the number of inbound and outbound M&A deals, 
which indicates the gap is larger.  The coverage of acquirer’s nation in the inbound M&A 
deals is limited.  For this reason, we focus on Japanese outbound M&A deals for the 
complete panel of nations where M&A deals are made.    
[Figure 1 around here] 
[Figure 2 around here] 
  Existing literature explains why a firm invests in foreign assets and suggests the 
synergies generated by managerial advantages, superior marketing ability, or technological 
advantages (see Caves (1971), Graham and Krugman (1995)) and exchange rates, for 
example, Blonigen (1997) and Georgopoulos (2008).  Blonigen (1997) suggested that real 
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dollar depreciations make Japanese acquisitions more likely in U.S. industries, and 
Georgopoulos (2008) used bilateral Canadian-U.S. industry level count data on cross-
border M&A and showed that a real dollar depreciation of the home currency led to an 
increase in the probability of foreign M&A only in high R&D sectors.  Prior studies on the 
link between the exchange rate and FDI provide evidence for the existence of a correlation 
between them.  In particular, the model assuming the informational imperfections in Froot 
and Stein (1991) presented that a depreciation of the home currency increases the relative 
wealth of foreign firms, enabling them to outbid domestic firms in acquiring corporate 
assets.  However, the trend shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrates that the Japanese 
outbound M&A activity is expanding regardless of the exchange rate movements 
(yen/dollar).  Although the slide in the yen makes overseas acquisitions more expensive, 
we observe the increasing trend in the outbound M&A activity reaching a new record high 
with total value worth JPY 10.5 trillion (US$87.6 billion) in 2015 when Americas targets 
were most acquired by Japanese firms (US$38 billion).  
These simple and visual illustrations suggest that the Japanese outbound M&A activity 
might be influenced not only by the exchange rate but also by other factors including the 
demographic effects such as the migration.  It should be noted that we analyze the impact 
of exchange rate between the yen and the local currency in the target country currency.  
We will carefully investigate the determinants of Japanese outbound M&A activity in the 
following section. 
 
2.2  Background on migrants in Japan 
As reported by official statistics (Ministry of Justice, Japan), the number of registered 
foreign nationals residing in Japan has approximately doubled in the past 20 years, 
reaching 2.69 million as of the end of 2015. The main sending country is China (32.9%) 
including Taiwan, followed by Korea (19.3%), the Philippines (9.4%), Brazil (6.5%), 
Vietnam (5.6%) and the United States (3.2%). In 2015, the immigrants regularly registered 
represented the 2.1% of total Japanese population. This percentage is still far below the 
ones reported for the same year in other developed countries like the United States (14.3%), 
Canada (27.7%), Germany (11.9%), United Kingdom (12.4%), France (11.6%), Spain 
(13.8%) and Italy (9.4%). That is probably why, Japan is generally considered to be 
ethnically homogeneous than almost any other developed country. However, many 
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researchers argue that the modern Japan is already a multiethnic country, for example Lie 
(2001). Moreover, the Japanese government has identified in mass immigration the main 
solution to both stop the demographic decrease and the ageing of the population. 
Japanese firms which face the problem of operating in a mature market have been 
expanding business overseas. Accordingly, Japanese workers engaging in their overseas 
business reside abroad.  The number of registered Japanese nationals residing outside 
Japan has also about doubled in the past 20 years, reaching 1.3 million as of the beginning 
of October 2014. The main destination country is the United States (32.1%), followed by 
China (10.4%), Australia (6.6%), the United Kingdom (5.2%), Thailand (5.0%) and 
Canada (4.9%).  The top sending countries and destination countries are not symmetric, but 
both the number of registered foreign born people residing in Japan and registered 
Japanese natives residing outside Japan is increasing.  In this paper, we consider 
immigrants the number of (working age) foreign born people residing in Japan, and 
registered Japanese natives residing outside Japan as Japanese emigrants. Figure 3 plots the 
number of immigrants in Japan and the number of Japanese emigrants.  The shaded 
vertical bars represent recession periods as defined by the Cabinet Office, the government 
of Japan. 
[Figure 3 around here] 
Figure 3 illustrates that the number of immigrants in Japan decreased after the global 
financial crisis stemming from 2007 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, then they grew again 
substantially during the last few years.  In contrast, the number of Japanese emigrants has 
been increasing regardless of the business cycle in Japan.  These trends suggest that there 
is a clear correlation between migration and Japanese outbound M&A activity.  The 
purpose of the next section is to investigate whether there is also a causal relationship. 
 
 
3.  Model and hypotheses 
3.1  Data  
We use a panel dataset to empirically investigate whether or not and to what extent 
the migration affects Japanese outbound M&A deals.  The data used to construct this panel 
dataset are based on several sources.  Data on Japanese outbound M&A deals by individual 
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firms that includes the deal value (millions US dollars), the announcement date of the deal, 
the details of both the acquiring company and the target company, such as nationality and 
sector, are taken from the Thomson Reuters’ Thomson One database.  The sample period 
for M&A deals runs from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2014. We exclude the M&A 
deal with missing value from our dataset. We aggregate the amount of all individual M&A 
deal values in order to obtain the country level panel dataset.  
The figures on immigrant stock and the stock of Japanese citizens residing abroad 
come from the official statistics published annually by the Ministry of Justice, Japan, 
which include the sending country and destination country information.  The data on 
immigrants also contain information about the immigrant’s age, which allowed us to 
calculate the number of immigrants of working age.  We matched data on immigrant stock 
(working age) and the stock of Japanese citizens residing abroad with the M&A deal 
country level panel dataset manually.  
The information on characteristics for each country in the dataset includes the growth 
rate of the real GDP per capita (constant local currency) of the target country, inflation rate 
as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, country risk as 
measured by the index up to 10 (lowest risk), distance between the main city (capital) in 
the target country and Japan, and official exchange rate.  Figures on the growth rate of the 
real GDP per capita (constant local currency), inflation rate as measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator and annualized official exchange rate are from 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2016, retrieved March, 2016).  We 
calculated the (yen/ target country currency) exchange rate1 using the official exchange 
rate (local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar) and the official exchange rate (U.S. 
dollar to Japanese yen). 
The data on the distance between the main city (capital) in the target country and 
Japan come from the GeoDist database http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
which is available online.  The detailed information about GeoDist database is documented 
in the Notes on CEPII’s distances measures by Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
The country risk variable is an index taking the value from 2 (highest risk) to 10 
(lowest risk) based on the Country Risk Survey conducted by Rating and Investment 
                                                          
1 Blonigen (1997) noted that specifications using real exchange rate and nominal exchange rate yielded 
almost identical results. 
8 
 
Information, Inc. (R&I).  The information is available in the semiannual report R&I 
Country Risk Survey and based on a questionnaire referring to expected risks in terms of 
politics, society, economy and international relations. The respondent is mainly from banks, 
trading companies, manufacturing companies, and research firms/academics based in 
Japan.  We collect the country risk index for each country and matched with our country 
level panel dataset.   
In order to investigate whether the effect of migrants is equal across sectors, we use 
the target company’s sector information in the individual M&A deal to aggregate outbound 
M&A deal value and the number of outbound M&A deals by sector.  Sectors are classified 
into manufacturing/non-manufacturing sectors based on the Japan Standard Industrial 
Classification and high R&D/low R&D sectors based on the R&D intensity published in 
Report on the Survey of Research and Development by Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. The sector with R&D intensity above average is assigned to the 
subsample of high R&D sectors. 
Table 1 shows the between and within descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
estimation. The variable M&A dummy is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value unity if 
the outbound M&A deal is made in a country and zero otherwise. The sample period runs 
from 2000 to 2013.  The end point was determined by the availability of data used in the 
estimation.   
 
3.2  Empirical methodology  
        In the full dataset of 826 observations on aggregated amounts of M&A deal value for 
each country, about half the observations are reported as being zero (see Table 1).  
However, it is not possible to distinguish whether these observations actually refer to 
countries with zero value or countries for which data on M&A deal is actually missing.  In 
addition to this problem, there is a large gap between the M&A deal value that are reported 
to be zero and those that are reported to be non-zero. 
To deal with these problems and to investigate the robustness of the estimated results, 
Cragg's (1971) model for censored data is adopted.  This model assumes the impact of an 
explanatory variable on the acquiring firm's decision of making a deal or not is different 
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from its impact on the decision of how much to spend on the M&A deal, once the firm has 
decided to make a deal.   
          The model considers two equations: a decision equation and a regression equation 
for the nonlimit observations. The decision equation is assumed to be 
  
*
*
Prob[M&A 0] ( ' ),
Prob[M&A 0] 1 ( ' ),
it it
it it


  
  
x
x
                                        (1) 
where    is a vector of unknown coefficients, itx  is a set of factors that influence the 
decision, *M&Ait  is an unobserved variable, and   is the cumulative density function for 
the normal distribution. When *M&A 0it   the firm makes a deal, and when *M&A 0it   the 
firm does not make a deal. 
         When *M&A 0it  , the expected value for M&Ai  for the nonlimit observations is 
 *E[M&A | M&A 0] ,it it it it   x   (2) 
where    is a vector of unknown coefficients, and it   is the inverse Mills ratio. The 
model is a combination of a univariate probit model (1) and the truncated regression model 
(2). A likelihood ratio test can be used to test /   , namely, whether the restrictions of 
the Tobit model (the parameters in (1) and (2) are same) are appropriate by estimating the 
truncated regression model, the Tobit model, and the probit model separately. The 
computed likelihood ratio statistic2 in our model (p-val=0.00) suggests that we estimate the 
decision model (1) and M&A deal value model (2) separately. We also examined the 
sample selection problem in our models.  The result was that the coefficients of the sample 
selection terms are not significantly different from zero (p-val=0.48).  Hence, equations  
(1) and (2) will be estimated separately. 
        The number of Japanese outbound M&A deals is a non-negative integer variable. 
There is a same specification problem that the zero or nonzero value of the outcome is the 
result of a separate decision whether or not to invest in a country. A hurdle model is the 
                                                          
2 The likelihood ratio statistic can be computed as 2[log log log ],TR P TL L L     where LTR, LP and 
LT are the maximized values of the log-likelihood function for the truncated regression model, the probit 
model and the Tobit model, respectively. The degrees of freedom of this test are given by the dimension of 
 . (see Greene (2011) for the detailed explanation) 
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specification test corresponding to Cragg's (1971) model in continuous data (see Greene 
(2011) for the explanation), 
 
Prob[M&A 0 | ] ,
exp( )Prob[M&A | ] (1 ) ,   1, 2,....
![1 exp( )]
it i
j
it it
it it
it
e
j e j
j

  



 
    
x
x
   (3) 
where M&Ait is the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals.  The test result is p-
val=0.00, strongly in favor of estimating two equations for the decision model and the 
nonzero value of the outcome (the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals) separately 
compared to the pooled Poisson model. 
        The Poisson model is commonly used to explain non-negative integer dependent 
variable, but the Poisson assumption that the mean equals the variance has been criticized.  
The negative binomial model has served as the most common extension of the Poisson 
model to allow for overdispersion. Hence, we will estimate the model to explain the 
number of Japanese outbound M&A deals by the negative binomial model assuming the 
distribution of M&Ait  is left truncated at one and GMM in the Wooldridge form (see 
Greene (2012) for the estimation details). 
 
 
4.  Estimation results 
        The first model in this analysis is the decision equation whether to make a deal or not 
in a potential target firm’s country.  The variables that are assumed to influence the 
decision are the following: LN IMMIGRANTS (2-YEAR LAG) is the log of the two year 
lag of the total stock of immigrants from each target country present in Japan; LN 
JAPANESE (2-YEAR LAG) is the log of the two year lag of the total stock of Japanese 
citizens residing abroad in each target country; GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA is the 
growth rate of GDP per capita to proxy for the change in the purchasing power of 
consumers in the potential target country; INFLATION is the inflation rate to capture the 
macroeconomic stability in the target country; COUNTRY RISK is the country risk index 
as a measure of the risk that the Japanese firm faces in the target country with respect of 
politics, society, economy and international relations; and EXCHANGE RATE is the 
exchange rate to control Japanese buying power of assets in the target country. 
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Table 2 reports estimates of the marginal effects and their t-statistics for the variables 
that are assumed to influence the decision.  The estimation results by Logit model and 
Probit model are qualitatively similar.  The variable of interest is the migrant variable.  In 
the decision model, the Hausman specification test for exogeneity does not reject the 
hypothesis of exogeneity, hence we use the log of the two year lag of the total stock of 
immigrants and that of Japanese citizens residing abroad as migration variables.  Migrant 
variables LN IMMIGRANTS and LN JAPANESE are positively correlated, thus each 
model uses a different migrant variable.  The migrant variables are statistically significant 
in both models (logit and probit3).  An increase in the stock of immigrants in Japan from a 
potential target country raises the probability of that country to be invested in by Japanese 
firms.  The information from Japanese residing in the target country is found to be 
important as well as from the immigrants when the firm makes a decision whether to invest 
or not in a potential target country.  The positive relationship between the stock of 
Japanese citizens residing abroad and cross-border M&A decision is consistent with the 
intuitive prediction, but exiting literature does not shed light on this effect as much as that 
of immigrants.  The marginal effects of COUNTRY RISK in columns 1 and 3 suggest that 
the firms put emphasis on risks in terms of politics, society, economy and international 
relations when making a decision. 
          As a measure of Japanese outbound M&A activity, we employ two variables: 
aggregated amounts of individual M&A deal value and the number of M&A deals in a 
target country.  We begin our analysis for outbound M&A deal value with an OLS model 
and present the results for five different sample groups: whole sample, manufacturing 
sectors, non-manufacturing sectors, high R&D sector and low R&D sector. 
The reason why we consider different sample groups is that the information 
problems that usually exist between countries might also differ within the same target 
country across sectors where the target companies operate.  Moreover, the information 
spillover between each acquiring firm and its employed foreign workers might play an 
important role in reducing the information asymmetry.  If foreign born workers are not 
distributed homogeneously among sectors in Japan, as it happens in the other developed 
                                                          
3 Greene (2012) states that ‘brute force’ method estimates the fixed effects model, although it can encounter 
the incidental parameters problem. Its advantage is that marginal effects in the fixed effects model are 
computed at the means of the data and with the sample average of the fixed effects estimates as the constant 
term.  
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countries, then immigrants might affect the M&A activity differently depending on the 
specific sector.  Moreover, differences in the skill level composition between the 
communities of immigrants living in Japan and Japanese citizens living in the target nation 
might affect the impact of immigrants on M&A activity as well. If, for example, the 
Japanese living abroad are more skilled than immigrants living in Japan, it is possible that 
the effect of the former on M&A will be higher in the high skilled intensive sectors. Thus, 
both the distribution of foreign workers among sectors in Japan and their skill level might 
affect the impact of immigrants on M&A value. Unfortunately, data regarding the skill 
level of immigrants in Japan are not available, let alone data regarding the skill level of 
foreign born workers by sector. We thus employ two different subsamples, and Table 3-a 
contains OLS estimation results. The first differentiates between M&A deal value in the 
manufacturing sectors and in the non-manufacturing sectors (columns 3-6), whilst the 
second considers high R&D sectors and low R&D sectors (columns 7-10).  
The results when considering the overall M&A deal value (columns 1 and 2) show 
that both the stock of immigrants living in Japan and the stock of Japanese living in the 
target nations positively affect the M&A deal value in these countries.  The overall positive 
impact of migration is confirmed when only the deals in the manufacturing sectors are 
considered (columns 3 and 4).  However, immigrants seem not to affect the M&A deal 
value when the target company is not a manufacturing firm (column 5), whilst the effect of 
Japanese communities living in the target nations is positive and statistically significant 
(column 6).  According to the OLS results, both the stock of immigrants and the Japanese 
abroad do not affect the M&A deal value in the high R&D sectors (columns 7 and 8), 
while only the stock of Japanese in the target nations seems to affect the M&A deals in the 
low R&D sectors (columns 9 and 10). 
Overall these results provide evidence of a positive impact of migration on the 
M&A value, but as we explained before they might be biased due to the reverse causality 
running from M&A deals and immigrants. First, potential immigrants in the target nations 
might have less incentive to migrate to Japan because the M&A deals rise job opportunities 
in the origin countries, and immigrants living in Japan might return to their origin country 
and find a job in the acquired companies. The resulting bias in this case is likely to be 
negative. Second, more M&A deals might stimulate the return migration also for the 
Japanese living abroad, but more Japanese could be sent to work abroad in the acquired 
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company. Which one of the two opposite effects will prevail might vary, depending on 
several factors (e.g., the destination country, the type of immigrant and their skill level). 
Thus, for the stock of Japanese living abroad the sign of the bias appears to be less 
predictable.  
In order to correct for the endogeneity bias we apply the 2SLS estimator.  We use 
as instrument for the stock of immigrants living in Japan the predicted flows of immigrants 
determined only by non-economic migration determinants, that is population size, country 
risk, distance and other fixed factors captured by the fixed effects. Likewise, the instrument 
for the stock of Japanese living abroad has been constructed by estimating the exogenous 
outflows of Japanese which is not explained by economic factors. The results from the first 
stage in Table 3-b show that the estimated coefficients for the instruments are always 
positive with a high statistical significance, moreover also the F-test is substantially high. 
The results from the second stage report some noticeable differences with respect to the 
previous OLS results. First, the impact of migration on the total amount of M&A deals is 
confirmed to be positive for both immigrants and Japanese living abroad, however the 
estimated coefficients (columns 1 and 2) are bigger than the OLS coefficients. Second, the 
previous results are confirmed also for the manufacturing sectors, but the estimated 
impacts (columns 3 and 4) are bigger and more statistically significant than the OLS 
counterparts. Third, the impact of immigrants estimated by 2SLS is positive and 
statistically significant also for the non-manufacturing sectors, and the impact of Japanese 
stock is bigger than that estimated by OLS. Fourth, also with regards to the low R&D 
sectors the 2SLS estimates now show that the stock of immigrants exerts a positive effect 
on the M&A deal value, and that the effect for the Japanese living abroad is higher than the 
one estimated with the simple OLS estimator. Finally, the results from the 2SLS estimator 
confirm that migration does not affect the M&A deal value in both the high R&D sectors 
and the low R&D sectors. Thus, after correcting for the endogeneity bias the impact of 
migration on the M&A deal value on the whole appears to be higher than the one estimated 
by simple OLS and the bias seems to be particularly strong and of  negative sign for the 
impact of immigrants living in Japan.     
           Then, we employ another measure for Japanese outbound M&A activity, the 
number of outbound M&A deals in a target country. The results in Table 4 show the 
overall effect of factors which may affect the number of outbound M&A activity. Due to 
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the endogeneity problem in migrants and M&A activity, we use the value for the 
immigrant stock and the stock of Japanese citizens residing abroad estimated using only 
exogenous instrument variables (fitted_ln immigrants and fitted_ln japanese) instead of the 
2 year lag of immigrant stock and Japanese stock as explanatory variables. The variables of 
interest are these two migrant variables, and their coefficients in columns 1-4 are 
statistically significant and positive. The results for other explanatory variables vary across 
the estimation methods partly due to instruments in GMM estimation, where we use the 
value for the immigrant stock and the stock of Japanese citizens residing abroad estimated 
using only exogenous variables and the one year lag of other explanatory variables as 
instruments. However, the coefficients of interest are robust across estimation methods, 
and show the positive effect of migrants on the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals. 
This result also implies that the larger presence of immigrants from the target country and 
Japanese communities in the target country alleviate the informational problems and 
stimulate Japanese outbound M&A activity. 
            Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients for the subset of manufacturing sectors 
and non-manufacturing sectors. The estimated coefficients for migrant variables tell 
essentially the same story. Both the presence of immigrants from the target country and 
Japanese communities in the target country are important determinants for Japanese 
outbound M&A activity. In addition, the inflation and country risk have significant effects 
on Japanese outbound M&A activity. The results so far imply that the significance of 
factors for the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals is similar across manufacturing 
sectors and non-manufacturing sectors once firms decide to make a deal in a target country.  
           Estimation results for the subset of low R&D sectors and high R&D sectors are 
presented in Table 6. The coefficients of interest, immigrant stock and Japanese stock, are 
significantly positive both in low R&D sectors and high R&D sectors.  In contrast to the 
Table 5, the impact of factors is different between the two groups. The impacts of 
immigrants stock and Japanese stock are larger in high R&D intensity sector.  It can be 
interpreted that the information is more valuable in high R&D sectors, where they have 
more firm-specific assets and innovative technology.  The significant coefficients for 
inflation rate in low R&D sectors show that the macroeconomic stability is important for 
low R&D sectors but not for high R&D sectors.  The impact of factors for low R&D 
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sectors and high R&D sectors is different, but both the immigrant stock and Japanese stock 
are important factors with high significance for high R&D sectors. 
 In sum, we confirm the positive relationship between the migrants, which refer to 
the immigrants in Japan and Japanese citizens residing in the target country, and Japanese 
outbound M&A activity.  Because the M&A deal value and the number of M&A deals 
have different features, results for R&D intensity groups are different depending on the 
measure of M&A activity.  However, overall results suggest the positive link between the 
migrants and outbound M&A activity.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
            This study investigates empirically the role of immigrants in Japan and Japanese 
communities abroad in Japanese outbound M&A activity. Facing the rapid aging and 
shrinking market at home, Japanese firms are buying overseas assets at a record pace 
regardless of the exchange rate movements. One of obstacles in the cross-border M&A 
activity is the informational problem.  Although immigrant population share in Japan is 
still small among developed countries, our estimates provide evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that both networks of immigrants and Japanese citizens living abroad alleviate 
the informational problems and stimulate Japanese outbound M&A activity, even if the 
different channels through which these networks operate cannot be easily estimated due to 
lack of data. Our results suggest that the migrant networks facilitate Japanese outbound 
M&A activity, in a sense, a matching between the acquiring company and the overseas 
target company. 
           Sectoral analysis also supports this hypothesis, but one might think the detailed 
information on immigrant workers such as education might be important.  Since the 
information regarding the educational attainment of both immigrants in Japan and Japanese 
residing abroad is not available, it remains for future research, that is when more 
disaggregated data will be available, to further analyze how differences in migrants’ 
characteristics, such as the skill level, affect the nexus between the migration and the cross-
border M&A activity. 
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              We also find the significant role of immigrants and Japanese citizens residing 
abroad in firm’s decision making whether to make a deal in a potential target country or 
not.  This decision stage is not fully examined in the existing literature.  Our results further 
imply that networks of immigrants and Japanese communities abroad could be more 
important and have more positive links with the firm’s cross-border M&A deals through 
various stages of firms’ activities and decisions. 
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Figure 1. The Number of Cross-border M&A Deals and the Exchange Rate 
  
Sources: Thomson Financial, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Figure 2. Cross-border M&A Deal Value and the Exchange Rate 
 
Sources: Thomson Financial, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Figure 3. Trends in Migrants (Stock) and the Business Cycle in Japan 
 
Notes: Sample period: 2000-2014. The figure plots the number of foreign nationals 
residing in Japan (Immigrants) and the Japanese citizens residing overseas (Emigrants).  
The shaded vertical bars represent recession periods as defined by the Cabinet Office, the 
government of Japan. 
 
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, Ministry of Justice in Japan 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
         
M&A dummy overall 0.5 0.5    0 1 N = 826
 between 0.3 0.1 1 n = 59 
 within 0.4 -0.5 1.4 T = 14 
      
Value of M&A deals overall 422276 2109714     0 43100000 N = 826
 between 1302813 250 9785747 n = 59 
 within 1667429 -9106818 33800000 T = 14 
      
Number of outbound  overall 4 11 0 113 N = 826
M&A deals between 10 0.0714286 54 n = 59 
 within 5 -25.81598 65 T = 14 
      
Non-manufacturing  overall 281853 1606063    0 32300000 N = 826
M&A value between 973288    0 7362783 n = 59 
 within 1283384 -6974175 25200000 T = 14 
      
Manufacturing M&A  overall 126645 752706    0 14000000 N = 826
value between 355918    0 2413072 n = 59 
 within 664744 -2218947 13000000 T = 14 
      
Low R&D sector  overall 322248 1797367    0 38600000 N = 826
M&A value between 1072968    0 8106427 n = 59 
 within 1448244 -7675424 30800000 T = 14 
      
High R&D sector  overall 86250 623189 0 13700000 N = 826
M&A value between 263966 0 1669428 n = 59 
 within 565495 -1515698 12700000 T = 14 
      
Immigrants overall 28067 93337 6 629469 N = 826
 between 92606 14 509970 n = 59 
 within 16467 -186047 147566 T = 14 
      
Japanese overall 15107 41584 20 303216 N = 826
 between 41788 37 302771 n = 59 
 within 3242 -6470 37084 T = 14 
      
Growth of GDP per  overall 2.58 3.93 -15.15 33.03 N = 824
capita between 2.30 -3.32 10.98 n = 59 
 within 3.20 -13.06 27.74 T = 14 
      
Inflation Rate overall 5.60 7.93 -25.13 103.82 N = 823
 between 4.43 0.77 18.92 n = 59 
 within 6.60 -29.74 90.50 T = 14 
      
Country risk overall 7.22 2.20 2.30 10.00 N = 754
 between 2.17 3.56 9.95 n = 55 
 within 0.57 4.20 9.00 T = 14 
      
Exchange rate overall 55.68 66.37 0.004 333.48 N = 826
(Yen/Local currency) between 64.61 0.006 278.30 n = 59 
 within 17.18 -10.42 152.15 T = 14 
Note: The number in the cell is divided by a thousand.
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Table 2. Determinants of the M&A decision: bivariate choice 
 Marginal Effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln immigrants (2-year lag) 0.25*** 0.22*** 
(2.54) (3.48) 
ln Japanese (2-year lag) 0.28*** 0.26*** 
(2.97) (3.94) 
Growth of GDP per capita -0.35 0.46 -0.22 0.46 
(-0.37) (0.51) (-0.26) (0.56) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
(-0.44) (-0.35) (-0.48) (-0.42) 
Country risk 0.11** 0.05 0.10*** 0.04 
(2.38) (1.53) (3.00) (1.56) 
Exchange rate -0.0005 -0.002 0.0002 -0.002 
  (-0.48) (-2.01) (0.20) (-1.98) 
Estimation method Logit FE Logit FE Probit Brute Force Probit Brute Force 
Log likelihood -252.95 -247.84 -255.23 -248.07 
Number of Observations 526 526 526 526 
Notes: The values of the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 3-a. Amount of M&A deal value and migration: OLS 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
NON-
MANUFACTURING HIGH R&D  LOW R&D  
Variable (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)   
ln Immigrants 1.760 ** 1.350 * 0.526 0.086 1.433
(2-year lag) (2.18) (0.70) (0.550) (0.64) (1.39)
ln Japanese 2.666 *** 1.538 * 1.660 ** 1.421 1.998 *** 
(2-year lag) (5.49) (1.75) (2.58) (1.48) (3.00) 
Growth of GDP per capita -0.051 -0.024 0.053 0.067 -0.032 -0.022 -0.021 -0.012 -0.147 0.006 
(-0.99) (-0.52) (0.53) (0.68) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-1.27) (-0.16) (-0.258) (0.14) 
Inflation 0.035 0.019 0.123 ** 0.103 0.051 0.041 0.111 * 0.101 0.022 0.014 
(0.80) (0.50) (2.12) (1.65) (1.08) (0.88) (1.72) (1.49) (0.51) (0.33) 
Country risk 0.106 0.096 -0.025 -0.021 0.172 0.180 -0.423 -0.417 0.151 0.109 
(0.63) (-0.52) (-0.09) (-0.09) (0.84) (0.90) (-1.25) (-1.37) (0.74) (0.50) 
Exchange rate -0.016 -0.019 * -0.021 * -0.022 * -0.025 * -0.027 * 0.012 0.011 -0.014 -0.016 
(-1.65) (-1.77) (-1.95) (-1.79) (-1.95) (-1.93) (0.60) (0.52) (-1.16) (-1.32) 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 317   317   223   223   254  254   170  170  282  282   
Notes: t-statics computed using robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3-b. Amount of M&A deal value and migration: 2SLS 
STAGE I TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
NON-
MANUFACTURING HIGH R&D  LOW R&D 
Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   
Instrument Imm 0.812 *** 0.690 *** 0.741 *** 0.687 *** 0.807 *** 
(9.41) (5.95) (8.12) (5.88) (9.51)
Instrument Em 0.789 *** 0.749 ** 0.759 *** 0.767 *** 0.780 *** 
(9.63) (6.61) (8.06) (5.99) (.089) 
F-test  13.56 17.78 8.20 9.74 12.54 14.28 9.35 8.23 14.48 14.71 
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
ln Immigrants 4.694 ** 7.500 *** 5.937 *** 4.031 5.407 *** 
(2-year lag) (2.97) (2.67) (2.99) (1.35) (3.32)
ln Japanese 4.392 *** 6.101 ** 5.288 *** 3.148 5.088 *** 
(2-year lag) (1.423) (2.73) (3.12) (1.34) (3.39) 
Growth of GDP per capita -0.064 -0.011 0.089 0.135 -0.127 -0.023 -0.008 0.003 -0.062 0.012 
(-0.97) (-0.52) (0.90) (1.34) (-1.51) (-0.31) (-0.08) (0.03) (-0.90) (0.19) 
Inflation 0.045 0.013 0.123 * 0.043 0.015 0.011 0.086 0.081 -0.004 -0.013 
(1.00) (0.50) (1.79) (0.059) (0.27) (0.19) (1.10) (1.04) (-0.07) (-0.26) 
Country risk 0.071 0.074 -0.061 -0.033 0.204 0.205 -0.368 -0.391 0.134 0.034 
(0.31) (0.52) (-0.19) (-0.10) (0.71) (0.74) (-1.02) (-1.11) (0.55) (0.14) 
Exchange rate -0.016 -0.021 -0.021 -0.027 * -0.032 ** -0.032 ** 0.009 0.009 -0.016 -0.0192 
(-1.37) (-1.77) (-1.41) (-1.85) (-2.30) (-2.40) (0.57) (0.58) (-1.26) (-1.58) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 317   317   223   223   254   254   170   170   282   282   
Notes: t-statics computed using robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Table 4. Determinants of the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
fitted_ln immigrants (2-year lag) 0.23*** 1.31*** 
(3.68) (7.67) 
fitted_ln Japanese (2-year lag) 0.23** 1.82***
(2.56) (3.91) 
Growth of GDP per capita 2.57** 0.66 -2.53 -2.89 
(2.22) (0.38) (-0.14) (-0.21)
Inflation -0.003 0.002 0.75*** 0.50**
(-0.28) (0.15) (4.30) (2.48) 
Country risk 0.09 0.11 1.42*** 1.27* 
(0.96) (1.15) (7.89) (1.82) 
Exchange rate 0.004 0.005* 0.21 0.23 
(1.62) (1.65) (1.42) (1.34) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method FE NEGBIN ML FE NEGBIN ML GMM GMM 
Number of Observations 314 314 296 296 
Dispersion parameter (p-value) 0.51 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 
Overidenfication test 1.00 1.00 
Log likelihood -595 -591 5.77 5.95 
Notes: The values of the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the number of Japanese outbound M&As:  
                                      Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing sectors 
  Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
fitted_ln immigrants (2-year lag) 0.46*** 0.44*** 
(5.21) (6.43) 
fitted_ln Japanese (2-year lag) 0.46*** 0.44*** 
(5.24) (6.46) 
Growth of GDP per capita -2.07 -2.13 -0.59 -0.64 
(-0.38) (0.39) (-0.18) (-0.19) 
Inflation -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
(-2.75) (-2.75) (-3.71) (-3.70) 
Country risk -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.37*** -0.38*** 
(0.96) (3.52) (-3.90) (-3.94) 
Exchange rate 0.01* 0.01* 0.004 0.004 
(1.86) (1.87) (1.57) (1.57) 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method NEGBIN truncation NEGBIN truncation 
Number of Observations 221 221 252 252 
Dispersion parameter (p-value) 1.31 (0.01) 1.31 (0.00) 0.56 (0.00) 0.56 (0.00)
Log likelihood -427.01 -426.84 -501.08 5.95 
Notes: The values of the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of the number of Japanese outbound M&A deals: 
                                 High R&D sectors and Low R&D sectors 
  High R&D Low R&D 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
fitted_ln immigrants (2-year lag) 0.53 *** 0.09**  
(4.55) (1.98)  
fitted_ln Japanese (2-year lag) 0.54***  0.09** 
(4.58)  (1.99) 
Growth of GDP per capita -3.06 -3.17 4.65* 3.48 
(-0.46) (-0.48) (1.94) (1.40) 
Inflation -0.06 -0.06 -0.06*** -0.07*** 
(-1.06) (-1.05) (-2.53) (-2.82) 
Country risk -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.01 -0.01 
(-3.41) (-3.44) (-0.19) (-0.23) 
Exchange rate 0.009 0.009 0.004*** 0.003** 
(1.50) (1.50) (3.18) (2.50) 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method NEGBIN truncation 
 
Number of Observations 170 170 279 279 
Dispersion parameter (p-value) 1.07(0.02) 1.07(0.01) 0.16 (0.00) 1.19 (0.00) 
Log likelihood -313.75 -388.90 -530.43 -535.18 
Notes: The values of the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
